







The M/V “Louisa” Case: 
Spain and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 




The M/V “Louisa” Case was the first contentious procedure instituted against 
Spain before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS or the Tribunal) 
in a dispute concerning the detention of a vessel, registered in Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, at the port of Santa María (Cádiz)1. More recently, Spain presented its 
Statement in the procedure on the Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the 
Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), which has raised a strong debate on the 
scope of the ITLOS’s advisory jurisdiction and is pending the final decision by the 
Tribunal2.  
Though the activity of the ITLOS is limited in practice, it is increasing with the 
considerable expansion of international judicial function and institutions in 
contemporary International Law. Last reports on judicial settlement of international 
maritime disputes refer to 2013 as “the most eventful year so far in the history of 
dispute settlement in the law of the sea”3. Three cases terminated and ten new cases 
were brought before different forum involving a wide range of subject matters. Then, 
the potential recourse to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions under 
Section 2, Part XV, of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or 
the Convention) is progressively increasing its importance for Spain, as well as for the 
                                                          
1 Case Nª 18: The M/V “Louisa” Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain). All the 
documents relating to the case are available at the ITLOS Web site, www.itlos.org/. 
Spain was represented by C. Escobar as Agent, Counsel and Advocate. In the stage of the procedure on 
provisional measures, M.J. Aznar, as Counsel and Advocate; E. Molina as Adviser and J. Lorenzo, as 
Technical Adviser. In the stage of the procedures on the merits, J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares, M. J. 
Aznar and C. Jiménez Piernas, as Counsel and Advocates; R. Ojinaga and J. Lorenzo as Counsel; D. 
Vázquez as Adviser. At public sittings, the following experts were called by Spain: C. Martínez de 
Azagra; D. Stow; J. Preston Delgado; J.A. Martín Pallín. 
2 Case Nº 21: Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), Written Statement by the Kingdom of Spain, 29 November 2013. 
3 However, the position adopted by China in the dispute related to the West Philippine Sea, and by Russia 
in the Artic Sunrise case, both rejecting the recourse to arbitration under Annex VII of UNCLOS, was 
seem as a potential threat to UNCLOS dispute settlement system. (R. Churchill, “Dispute Settlement in 








rest of the States parties4. Partly, the interest of the M/V “Louisa” Case could be linked 
to these current tendencies in the adjudication of international maritime disputes. 
This note is about the main features of the M/V “Louisa” Case and its 
contribution to the development of the ITLOS’s jurisprudence on the Law of the Sea 
and, in particular, regarding those dispositions of UNCLOS, both substantive and 
procedural in character, which could appear decisive in holding the dispute5. Firstly, a 
summary is given on the factual and procedural background of the case. This is 
followed by an examination of the basis and scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
entertain the dispute by virtue of the unilateral declarations made by Saint Vincent and 
Spain under Article 287 of UNCLOS. The following two sections are about jurisdiction 
and admissibility matters under discussion both at the stage of the proceedings on 
provisional measures and at the stage of the proceedings on the merits, respectively. 
Final conclusions will be posed. 
THE M/V LOUISA CASE 
The Louisa was a vessel flaying the flag of Saint Vincent, which was owned and 
operated by Sage Maritime Partners Ltd., an affiliate of Sage Maritime Scientific 
Research Inc., both registered in Texas (USA). The vessel arrived in the port of Cádiz 
on 20 August 2004 and conducted operations in the territorial sea and the internal 
waters of Spain. According to Saint Vincent, the Louisa conducted sonar and cesium 
magnetic surveys of the sea floor with the aim of locating oil and gas deposits on the 
basis of a permit issued on 5 April 2004 by the Spanish Ministry of the Environment to 
the company Tupet Sociedad de Pesquisa Marítima S.A., a partner of Sage6. 
                                                          
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc A/CONF 62/122 (1982), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/textsunclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
5 R. Churchill, “Dispute Settlement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2010”,  6 
IJMCL, (2011), 495-523; Churchill, supra n. 2; C. Escobar, “España y el Tribunal Internacional de 
Derecho del Mar: especial referencia al caso M/V Louisa”, in J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares (Dir.),  
España y la práctica del Derecho Internacional, LXXV Aniversario de la Asesoria Jurídica Internacional 
del MEC (Colección Escuela Diplomática 20, Madrid 2013) 179; P. Gautier, “The International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea: Activities in 2010”, 10 Chinese JIL (2011) 865-881; N. Peiris, “M/V Louisa: in 
search of a Jurisdictional basis in the Law of the Sea Convention”, 29 IJMCL (2014) 149-157: E. Sessa, 
“Giurisprudenza Internazionale, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, 113 (3) Il Diritto 
Marittimo, (2011), 814-827; Y. Tanaka, “The M/V Louisa case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. the 
Kingdom of Spain, 23 December 2010), Request for Provisional Measures”, 26 IJMCL (2011) 481-490; 
Y. Tanaka, “A Note on the M/V “Louisa” Case”, 45 Ocean Development & International Law  (2014), 
205-220. A more specific study of certain aspects of the case, in Cortés Martín, M., “Prior Consultations 
and Jurisdiction at ITLOS”, 13 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2014), 1-26. 
6 The agreement between Sage and Tupet is partially reproduced in the Judgment of 28 May 2013 and 









On 1 February 2006 the Louisa was boarded, searched and detained at the port 
of Santa María in connection with preliminary proceedings initiated by Order dated 30 
November 2005 of the Juzgado de Instrucción Nº 4 de Cádiz. A second vessel, the 
Gemini III, was detained at Puerto Sherry. Two Hungarian crew members and the 
daughter of the representative of Sage on the Louisa, national of the USA, were arrested 
and subsequently released. Later, the representative of Sage and a beneficial owner of 
the Louisa, both nationals of USA, were charged with unlawful criminal acts under 
Spanish Law. During the search of the vessel, diverse pieces of undersea archaeological 
origin were found, as well as five assault rifles, considered weapons of war, and a 
handgun. According to the indictment issued by that Court on 27 October 2010, the 
Louisa was seized due to its direct relationship to an instrument for carrying out the 
crime of possession and depositing of weapons of war together with the continued crime 
of damaging Spanish historical patrimony7.  
 
By letter dated 23 November 2010, Saint Vincent filed an application instituting 
proceedings against Spain before the ITLOS. By the same letter, the Applicant 
submitted a request for the prescription of provisional measures under Article 290 (1) of 
UNCLOS. In its Application, Saint Vincent claimed that the continued detention of the 
Louisa and Gemini III was in breach of Articles 73 (notification of arrest), 87 (freedom 
of the high seas), 226 (investigation), 245 (scientific research) and 303 (archeological 
objects) of UNCLOS. In its Reply it invoked, additionally, article 227 (non-
discrimination with respect to foreign vessels) and changed the erroneous invocation of 
Article 303 by 304 (responsibility and liability by damages). After the finalization of the 
written proceedings, the Applicant sent a note to the ITLOS Register announcing it 
would raise new arguments related to the applicability of the doctrine of abuse of rights 
provided in Article 300. The Applicant requested the release of the Louisa and the 
Gemini III and the return of the property seized, and sought reparations in the amount of 
more than $40.000.000. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of value during the course of routine marine exploration and study. Additionally, it considers the division 
and payment for recovery. Only after the conclusion of the oral proceedings the applicant delivered a 
copy of the document to the ITLOS.  
7 The M/V Louisa case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Provisional Measures,  
Written Response of the Kingdom of Spain, 8 December 2010, paras. 11-43; The M/V Louisa case (Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Merits, Contra-Memorial of the Kingdom of Spain, 12 









The Spanish position was steady from the beginning of the proceedings. The 
conditions set out by UNCLOS governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of ITLOS had 
not been met, and the provisions of UNCLOS cited by the Applicant to support its 
arguments were no applicable to the facts under discussion in the M/V “Louisa” Case. 
Consequently, Spain asked the Tribunal to declare it lacked jurisdiction and, subsidiary, 
to declare that the Applicant's contention that Spain had breached its obligations under 
the Convention was manifestly unfounded. Therefore, Spain requested the Tribunal to 
reject each and every of the petitions made by Saint Vincent.  
 
Saint Vincent requested that the Application and the Request be referred to the 
Chamber of Summary Procedure, pursuant to Article 15(3), of the Statute. However, 
Spain did not agree with that request and invited the Tribunal, acting as a full court, to 
hear the case pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Statute. 
 
In its Order of 23 December 2010, the Tribunal held that it had prima facie 
jurisdiction over the M/V “Louisa” Case and found, by 17 votes to 4, that the 
circumstances were not such as to require the exercise of its powers to prescribe 
provisional measures8. Subsequently, in its Judgment on the merits, on 28 May 2013, 
the Tribunal found, by 19 votes to 2, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
Application filed by Saint Vincent9. 
JURISDICTION OF ITLOS 
The UNCLOS establishes a comprehensive legal framework to regulate all 
ocean spaces, its uses and resources. Thereof, its comprehensive dispute settlement 
regime was considered as essential to preserve the balance of rights among States 
parties as embodied in the Convention. The Section 1 of Part XV reaffirms the general 
obligation of the States to settle their disputes by peacefully means (Article 279 (1)). 
Nonetheless, where no settlement of the dispute has been reached by these means 
and no other procedure has otherwise been agreed upon the States parties to it, they are 
obliged to submit the dispute to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions as 
                                                          
8 The M/V Louisa case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain), Provisional Measures, 
Order, 23 December 2010. 









provided in Section 2 of Part XV10. Then, Article 287 (1) -the “choice of procedure” 
clause- establishes that, upon ratification of the Convention or at any time thereafter, 
States parties may file a declaration selecting one or more of the following jurisdictions: 
ITLOS, ICJ, arbitration under Annex VII or special arbitration under Annex VII. If the 
parties to a dispute have chosen the same forum, the dispute will be submitted only to 
that forum, unless the parties agree otherwise (Article 288 (4)). If the Parties have not 
selected the same forum, the dispute will be submitted to arbitration under Annex VII, 
unless the parties agree otherwise (Article 288 (5)). 
Thus, the ITLOS is a new specialized jurisdiction established in the framework 
of UNCLOS. Its jurisdiction ratione materiae comprises disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the UNCLOS -Article 288 (1)- and disputes concerning 
the interpretation or application of international agreements related to the purposes of 
UNCLOS conferring jurisdiction to the Tribunal -Article 288 (2)-11.   
 
The ITLOS has contentious jurisdiction on the grounds of unilateral declarations 
made by States under Article 28712. In addition, mandatory contentious jurisdiction over 
all States Parties to the Convention is conferred to the ITLOS in the procedure on 
prompt release of detained vessels and crews -Article 292- and the requests for 
provisional measures pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal under Annex VII -
Article 290(5)-. In practice, most of the activity of the Tribunal is related to both these 
procedures. The advisory jurisdiction of the ITLOS -Article 138 of the Rules in 
conjunction with Article 21 of the Statute- is currently under discussion. In addition, 
there is a more specific contentious, consultative and prejudicial competence conferred 
to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber under Part XI of UNCLOS with respect to activities 
in the Area. 
 
                                                          
10 The compulsory mechanism for the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the Convention does 
not apply to all matters regulated by the Convention. There are exceptions and facultative limitations 
relating to specific categories of disputes under Article 297 and Article 298, respectively.  
11 Article 21 of the Statute. A non-exhaustive list can be found in the ITLOS Webside. 
12 As of 10 Abril 2013, 165 States were parties in the UNCLOS, as well as the European Union. 
Moreover, 45 States had made a choice on the applicable dispute settlement means. They represent over 
one quarter of all States parties. Thirty-three States selected the ITLOS as the first option, either 
exclusively (12) or as an alternative to the ICJ.
 
Twenty States selected the ICJ, either exclusively (6) or as 
an alternative or subsidiary to the ITLO. Thirteen States, including Spain, choose both ITLOS and ICJ as 
the first option. Two States rejected the jurisdiction of the ICJ for any kind of dispute. Eight States 
selected arbitration under Annex VII as the first option, and two more as the second option. Eleven States 








THE SCOPE OF THE DECLARATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 287 OF 
UNCLOS 
 
The M/V “Louisa” Case was one of the few cases submitted to the Tribunal by 
unilateral application under Article 54 of the Rules. Both Saint Vincent and Spain were 
States Parties to UNCLOS and had accepted the jurisdiction of ITLOS by virtue of 
unilateral declarations under Article 287.  
 
Spain ratified the Convention on 15 January 1997 and made a declaration 
pursuant to Article 287 with effects from 19 July 2002. It states as follow:     
 
Pursuant to article 287, paragraph 1, the Government of Spain declares that it chooses the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice as means for 
the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. 
The Government of Spain declares, pursuant to the provisions of article 298, para. 1(a) of the 
Convention, that it does not accept the procedures provided for in part XV, section 2, with 
respect to the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 
and 83 relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving historic bays or titles. 13  
 
Saint Vincent ratified the Convention on 1 October 1993 and made its 
declaration under Article 287 of the Convention on 2 November 2010. It reads as 
follow: 
 
In accordance with Article 287, of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 […] the Government of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines declares that it 
chooses the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex 
VI, as the means of settlement of disputes concerning the arrest or detention of its vessels.  
 
Both States disagree on the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal  
in the light of the terms used the Applicant’s declaration. This issue, together with other 
issues raised by Spain regarding the “declaration ad hoc”14 made by Saint Vincent, was 
answered by the Tribunal on the basis of the assertion that:  
[…] the Convention does not preclude a declaration limited to a particular category of disputes 
or the possibility of making a declaration immediately before filing a case,15   
 
Firstly, considering that the terms used in the declaration of Saint Vincent were 
more limited than those of the Spanish declaration, the Tribunal made recourse to the 
                                                          
13 BOE, nº 170, de 17 de julio de 2003. This declaration replaces that made by Spain upon ratification of 
UNCLOS choosing ICJ (BOE, nº 39, de 14 de febrero de 1997). 
14 Escobar, supra note 4, at 197. 








ICJ’s jurisprudence on Article 36(2) of its Statute16 and affirmed that, when two 
unilateral declarations are involved, “jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal only 
insofar as the dispute is covered by the more limited declaration”17. Moreover, that 
declaration is a unilateral act of a State and “particular emphasis should be placed on the 
intention of the State having made it”18. By this way, it came to the conclusion that the 
terms “disputes concerning the arrest or detention of its vessels” were not limited to 
those articles of UNCLOS which expressly contain the word “arrest” or “detention”, but 
was meant to cover “all claims connected with the arrest or detention of its vessels”19.  
In sum, regarding this question: 
The Tribunal therefore considers that the declaration of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines covers 
the arrest or detention of its vessels and all matters connected therewith.20    
 
This is a weighty precedent because the ITLOS has specifically admitted the 
inclusion of limitations ratione materiae to its jurisdiction in unilateral declarations 
made by States under Article 287 of the Convention. It bases its affirmation in the 
practice of States both under Article 287 (1) of UNCLOS and Article 36 (2) of ICJ’s 
Statute21.  Although the Tribunal did not mention specific examples of this practice by 
States parties in UNCLOS other than Saint Vincent, it was concurrently holding its 
proceeding in the controversy on Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal 22. This case was considered as the 
initiation of a new practice regarding the implementation of Article 287 and consisting 
in the selection of a forum for a particular category of disputes or even as a specific 
dispute. Moreover, a more detained consideration of this question by the Tribunal, on 
                                                          
16 In particular, Certain Norwegian Loans, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p. 9, at p. 23 ; see also Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2006, p. 6, at p. 39, para. 88)      
17 Judgment, supra note 9, para. 81. 
18 Ibid., para. 82 
19 Ibid., para. 84. 
20 Ibid., para. 84. 
21 Ibid., para. 80. 
22 In October 2009 Bangladesh instituted proceeding against Myanmar under Annex VII of UNCLOS but 
the proceedings were subsequently transferred to the ITLOS (Case Nº 16, Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal) on the basis of an agreement between 
the parties expressed by concordant declarations under Article 287 conferring jurisdiction to ITLOS. In 
fact, it was considered that the proceedings had been instituted by notification of a special agreement 
(Article 24 (1) of the Statute). The declaration of Bangladesh covers the settlement of the dispute between 
Bangladesh and both Myanmar and the Republic of India “relating to the delimitation of their maritime 








the basis of a systematic interpretation of Part XV of UNCLOS23, seems to be 
necessary. There are differences between the facultative jurisdiction of ICJ for States 
making declarations under Article 36 of the Statute and the compulsory jurisdiction 
system established in Section 2, Part XV, of UNCLOS; in particular, considering that 
the only exceptions and limitations to applicability of compulsory procedures are those 
provided in Articles 297 and 298, and that Article 309 prohibits reservations to the 
Convention. Moreover, a reasonable interpretation of the admissibility of limitations to 
the competence of the Tribunal, or other particular forum chosen by States under Article 
287 of UNCLOS, leads to the conclusion that matters excluded by virtue of that 
unilateral declarations fall, at last, into the residual jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal24. 
But, it is arguable that the inclusion of “reservations” in unilateral declarations under 
Article 287 could increase the risk of fragmentation of the object of the controversies 
and problems of coordination among courts and tribunals acting inside and outside the 
framework of the disputes settlement regime of UNCLOS. In the past, consideration by 
the Tribunal of the concurrence of jurisdictions issues, both in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna Case and the MOX Plant Case, were drew to criticism. 
Secondly, the Tribunal made recourse to the jurisprudence of ICJ in the Right of 
Passage Case25 when stated that an application filed on the same day of the deposit of a 
declaration is not in contradiction with the requirements of the Statute. The 
jurisprudence invoked by the ITLOS was not questioned by Spain, but it also alleged 
that the Applicant’s procedural behavior was in contravention of the principle of good 
faith26. The declaration of Saint Vincent under Article 287 accepting the jurisdiction of 
the ITLOS was made two days before instituting proceedings against Spain. By that day 
the Applicant had already notified to the ITLOS the designation of its Agent. However, 
the main question was the Tribunal’s refusal to consider jointly both these arguments 
                                                          
23 In the Artic Sunrise case, the ITLOS was confronted with the terms of Russian declaration under 
Article 298, which are broader than those terms of article 298, paragraph 2 or 3. Netherlands stated that 
States parties could not go further the categories of disputes specifically provided in those paragraphs, as 
confirmed by the terms of Article 298 (1) (b) and Article 309 of UNCLOS. In its order on provisional 
measures under Article 290 (5), the ITLOS hold by assuming prima facie this interpretation. But 
questions under discussion in the Artic Sunrise case and those arose in the “Louisa” are not the same, 
because the limitations in Russian declaration could lead even to the exclusion of the residual jurisdiction 
of the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII. 
24 Gautier, supra note 4, at 879. On the same issue, Tanaka, supra note 4, at 207. 
25 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), (Preliminary Objections), 
[1957] I.C.J. Reports 125, at. 146). 
26 Professor Escobar has considered recently, the legitimate protection that Spain could be found in a 
clause like that included in the Spanish facultative declaration under Article 36 (2) of the ICJ’s Statute, in 
the light of the Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional 








and those regarding the exchange of views requirement under Article 283 of the 
Convention in order to exclude the unexpected recourse to jurisdictional procedures 
under section 2, Part XV, of UNCLOS.  Certainly, as the travaux préparatories of the 
Convention27 show, and Judge Anderson stated in the Artic Sunrise Case, “[t]he main 
purpose underlying 283 is to avoid the situation whereby a State is taken completely by 
surprise by the institution of proceedings against it”28 . 
 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 290 (1) OF UNCLOS 
 
The ITLOS has jurisdiction to prescribe provisional measures in two different 
situations. Under Article 290 (1) -which is applicable to all jurisdictional bodies 
empowered under Article 287-  a court or tribunal which considers it has prima facie 
jurisdiction under Part XV of UNCLOS may prescribe provisional measures. Under 
Article 290 (5) where an arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted and the parties 
have failed within two weeks to agree on submission of the request to a court or tribunal 
then ITLOS may to prescribe provisional measures if it considers, prima facie, that the 
tribunal which is to be constituted will have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the 
situation so requires. While Article 290 (1) reflects accepted notions of incidental 
jurisdiction, the residual jurisdiction provided for in Article 290 (5) is considered to be 
“a relative innovation in international practice”29. To date, two cases -the M/V “SAIGA” 
(Nº 2) and the M/V “Louisa”- were submitted to ITLOS under Article 290 (1)30. The 
residual jurisdiction under Article 290 (5) has been applied in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, MOX Plant, Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Strait of Johor, 
ARA Libertad and the Artic Sunrise. 
                                                          
27 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume II, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston 1993); Vol. V Settlement of Disputes, General and Final Provisions: Articles 
279 to 320, Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII and IX, Final Act, Annex I, Resolution I, III, and IV (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers , The Netherlands 1989); D. Anderson, “Article 283 of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea”, in Modern Law of the Sea. Selected Essays (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 
2008) 591. 
28 Case Nº 21, The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Russian Federation), Provisional 
Measures, Order of 2 November 2014, Declaration of Judge ad hoc Anderson, at 1, para 3. 
29 S. Rosenne, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Survey for 1999" 15 Int'l J Marine and 
Coastal L (2000) 442, at 467 [Survey for 1999]; P. Tomka and G.H., Hernández, “Provisional Measures 
in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, in Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber 
Amicorum Rudiger Wolfrum (Brill, Leiden 2011)1763. 
30 The request for provisional measures in M/V “SAIGA” (Nº 2) case was originally submitted to the 










Article 290 defines the powers of the Tribunal to prescribe provisional measures 
differently from the ICJ’s Statute. Firstly, Article 290 (3) empowers the Tribunal to 
prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures only at the request of a party to the 
dispute and after the parties have been given an opportunity to be heard, whereas the 
ICJ may prescribe provisional measures propio motu31. Secondly, Article 290 (6) 
establishes without ambiguity the binding nature of the provisional measures lay down 
by ITLOS32. Furthermore, by virtue of Article 95 of the Rules, parties have an 
obligation to inform the Tribunal as soon as possible as to its compliance with any 
provisional measures it has prescribed33. Thirdly, under Article 89(5) of the Rules, the 
ITLOS may prescribe measures different in whole or in part from those requested by the 
parties34.     
I. Prima Facie Jurisdiction of the ITLOS 
 
Before prescribing provisional measures under Article 290 (1), the Tribunal 
must satisfy itself that prima facie it has jurisdiction over the main dispute. The 
distinction between jurisdiction prima facie in proceedings on provisional measures and 
jurisdiction on the merits was established by the ITLOS in the M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) 
Case. In its Order in the M/V “Louisa” Case:  
 
Considering that, at this stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal does not need to establish 
definitively the existence of the rights claimed by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and that, in 
its Order of 11 March 1998 on provisional measures in the M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2  ) Case, the 
Tribunal stated that “before prescribing provisional measures the Tribunal need not finally 
satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case and yet it may not prescribe such 
measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear prima facie to afford a basis on 
which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal might be founded” (M/V  “SAIGA” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Provisional Measures, Order of 11 March 1998, ITLOS Reports 
1998, p.24, at p.37, para. 29).35 
 
                                                          
31 Article 41 of ICJ’s Statute. 
32 S. Rosenne (supra note 26), at 45, notes that Article 290 was also designed to avoid the ambiguity 
regarding an order of the ICJ indicating provisional measures, which was finally settled in LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2001, at 501-506. 
33 In contrast with Article 78 of the ICJ Rules of Court. 
34 T. Treves, “Provisional Measures Pending the Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal”, in Studi di Diritto 
Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, (Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2004) 1243, at 1252.  









The innovative character of the M/V “Louisa” proceedings on provisional 
measures has been recognized regarding, at least, the two following points36. For the 
first time, having found it had prima facie jurisdiction at the stage of the proceedings of 
provisional measures, the ITLOS held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the merits 
of the case. Also, for the first time, the Tribunal held that there were no reasons to 
prescribe provisional measures, neither the measures solicited by the Applicant, nor any 
other measures decided by the Tribunal37. Even if the application on request of 
provisional measures can be described as “a poorly argued application that in places 
appears to muddle provisional measures with the quite separate prompt-release-of-
vessels procedures”38, the M/V “Louisa” Case was nonetheless at this stage of the 
proceedings a real case of interest. The main debates were about the “low threshold” on 
prima facie jurisdiction and in the interpretation of the prior exchanges of views 
requirements under Article 283. In addition, Spain expressed its objections to the 
admissibility of the claims, but the Tribunal decided that this matter should be 
considered at a later stage of the proceedings39. 
 
a) The Existence of a Dispute Relating to the Interpretation or Application of 
UNCLOS 
 
In its Order, the Tribunal considered the existence of unilateral declarations of 
States parties accepting its jurisdiction under Article 287, as well as the Applicant’s 
invocation of several dispositions of the Convention in support of its claims. However, 
it did not examine the relevance of those provisions or its connection with the facts 
under discussion in the case40. It merely found, in relation to the “Louisa” but reserving 
its decision on the Gemini III41, that, 
[…] in the circumstances of this case, it appears prima facie that a dispute as to the interpretation 
and application of provisions of the Convention existed between the parties on the date on which 
the Application was filed.42 
 
                                                          
36 Tanaka, supra note 4, at 205. 
37 Escobar, supra note 4, at 182. 
38 Churchill, supra note 4, at 505. 
39 Provisional Measures, Order, supra nota 6, para. 67. 
40 Churchill, supra note 4, at 505. In the same way,Tanaka, supra note 4, at 208 and 210.  
41 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, paras. 43-45. 









The case law of the ITLOS confirms it has adopted a low threshold on prima 
facie jurisdiction as that assumed by the ICJ in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case43. 
Nonetheless, as contented by Judge Cot, regarding the Louisa there was not “the 
slightest shred of evidence of prima facie jurisdiction”44. Also, Judges Golitsyn, Treves 
and Wolfrum posed compelling reasons on the inexistence of an international maritime 
dispute and prima facie lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal45. Thereof, the posterior 
determination that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae has been described 
as “a dramatic taramount”46. Doctrinal criticism had been previously expressed 
regarding the ITLOS’s approach to prima facie jurisdiction in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna and MOX Plant Case. The reasons for that criticism were, more specifically, the 
treatment given by ITLOS to the concurrence of jurisdictions or related actions issues47 
arising in cases of treaty parallelism, as provided for in Article 282 of UNCLOS: 
 
On the other hand, the assertion by ITLOS of such a low threshold of prima facie jurisdiction in 
these applications has been the subject of heavy criticism. The failure of ITLOS to closely 
delineate the parameters of the dispute before it prior to making a finding of prima facie 
jurisdiction has been blamed for its apparently avaricious jurisdictional grab even in the face of 
competing treaty jurisdictions under which the disputes arguably more properly fell48. 
 
As evidenced in the jurisprudence of ICJ and other international courts and 
tribunals, the risk of contradiction between the decision on prima facie jurisdiction and 
the decision on jurisdiction on the merits by the competent Court or Tribunal could not 
                                                          
43 When adopting interim measures, the ICJ stated that “it cannot be accepted a priori that a claim based 
on such a complaint falls completely outside the scope of international jurisdiction” and hold it had prima 
facie jurisdiction but if found it lacked jurisdiction on the merits (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom 
v. Iran) (Interim Measures), Order, [1951] I.C.J., Reports 89, at 93)). 
44 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cot, para. 1. 
45 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, paras. 4-6; Dissenting Opinio of Judge Wolfrum, paras. 
19-26. In addition, Judge Treves linked the arguments on the inexistence of a dispute –as defined by PCIJ 
in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case- to the no satisfaction of prior exchanges of views 
requirement under Article 283, arguing that there were no opposition of views between the parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the dispositions of UNCLOS when the application was 
submitted to the Tribunal by Saint Vincent (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves, paras. 2-7). 
46 Churchill, supra note 2, at 6. Previously, considering the dissenting opinions of some judges at the stage 
of provisional measures, he wrote: “It is to be hoped that they will influence their colleagues to take a 
more robust view of jurisdictional issues when it comes to the main proceedings in this case. On the basis 
of the documentation available at the time of writing, it is difficult to see that there has been any breach of 
the LOSC by Spain” (Churchill, supra note 4, at 508). 
47 Y. Kerbrat, “Le différend relative à l’usine Mox de Sellafield (Irlande/Royaume-Uni): connexité des 
procedures et droit d’accès à l’information en matière environnementale”, AFDI (2004), 607-623. 
48 R. Rayfuse, “The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea Convention”, 36 
VUWRL (2005), 683; B. Kwiatkowska, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v 









be entirely preclude49, but such a situation is a very exceptional one. As stated by Judge 
Wolfrum, “provisional measures are binding on the parties to the dispute and constitutes 
an infringement of the sovereign rights of the responding State”50. In order to diminish 
the risk of that contradiction it will be desirable to minimize the difference between the 
decision of prima facie jurisdiction and that of jurisdiction on the merits, especially 
when the Tribunal is called upon to decide prima facie on its own jurisdiction under 
Article 290 (1)51. In the view of Judge Treves, even at the stage on provisional 
measures, the requirements for determination of the existence of a dispute set out in the 
jurisprudence of the PCIJ in Mavrommatis Case and the ICJ in South West Africa, and 
accepted by ITLOS in its Order in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases52, must be read 
together with the requirement that, in the case of the Tribunal, the dispute must concern 
the interpretation or application of the Convention53.  
b) Exchange of Views under Article 283 of UNCLOS 
In Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria) Case54, the ICJ confirmed that there is not a rule of general international law 
establishing the obligation of exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations as a precondition 
for a matter to be referred to an international court or tribunal55. Nonetheless, the 
requirement of previous negotiation, consultation or exchange of views can be found in 
conventional clauses as a part of a particular dispute settlement regime56. The UNCLOS 
includes this special rule in Article 283 (1), which reads as follows:  
                                                          
49 Georgia v. Russian Federation case, (Preliminary Objections), [2011[, I.C.J., Reports 70. 
50 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para. 11; Tanaka, 
supra note 4, at 216 
51 Ibid., para. 7. 
52 ITLOS Reports 1999, p.280 ff., at paragraph 44 
53 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves, para.6 
54 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 275, at p. 303, paragraph 56). Order, para. 64. On this 
matter, Torres Bernárdez, S, “Are Prior Negotiations a General Condition for Judicial Settlement by the 
International Court of Justice?”, in Armas Barea, C.A./Barberis, J.A. (eds.): Liber Amicorum in 
Memorian of Judge J.M. Ruda, Kluwer, The Hague, 2000. 
55 J.L., Charney, “Compromisory Clauses and the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice”, 81 
AJIL (1987), 859-864; -e. Kirgis, Prior Consultation in International Law: A Study of State Practice 
(University Press of Virginia, Charlotresville, 1983). 
56 Another relevant example of this special rule could be found in Article 21 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, interpreted by the ICJ in a very severe way in the 
Application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Case, Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 1 April 2011 (Cortés, supra note 4. at 8). The same issues were confronted by 
the ICJ in in the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite Case (Belgium v. Senegal) Judgment of 20 July 
2012. There are more examples of this clauses in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States 









1. When a dispute arises between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of 
this Convention, the parties to the dispute shall proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views 
regarding its settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means; 
2. The parties shall also proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views where a procedure for the 
settlement of such a dispute has been terminated without a settlement or where a settlement has 
been reached and the circumstances require consultation regarding the manner of implementing 
the settlement. 
 
Spain contented that the requirement set out in article 283 in order to facilitate 
the settlement of disputes without the need to resort to judicial or arbitral proceedings 
had not been satisfied57. On its side, the Applicant mentioned several approaches made 
by legal representatives of Sage and by its maritime administration to the port 
authorities of Spain for further information about the detention of the Louisa58. There 
was not clarification on the importance conferred on these acts by the Tribunal, but four 
judges in their dissenting opinions posed arguments against the consideration of these 
contacts, “nor at the level of national governments”59, as an exchange of views in the 
sense of the article 283.  
 
Then, the main question was about the Note Verbale dated 26 October 2010, sent 
to the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations in New York, by the 
Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent to the United Nations in New York, informing 
Spain it objected to the Kingdom of Spain’s continued detention of the ships “Louisa” 
and “Gemini III” and announcing its plans to pursue an action before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The absence of reaction from Spain was open to 
discussion between the parties but, in any case, as noted by Judge Treves in their 
dissenting opinion, Saint Vincent merely express its purpose to institute proceedings 
against Spain, but did not give any indication of its claims or rights nor about its 
intention to proceed to an exchange of views to settle the dispute through negotiations 
or other means60. Then, these could be interpreted as a lack of that intention, as 
confirmed by the fact that the Applicant sent its Note Verbal to Spain when it had 
already notified the Tribunal the appointment of its Agent and made its declaration of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations 
of a Universal Character (Article 64). On this practice, see the Manuel sur le réglement pacifique des 
différends (Nations Unies, New York 1992). 
57 Written Response of the Kingdom of Spain, supra note 6, para. 25. Presentation by Professor Aznar 
Gómez, Counsel and Advocate of Spain, ITLOS/PV.10/6Rev.1, at 12. 
58 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, para 59. 
59 Ibid., Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, 3; Dissenting Opinion od Judge Wolfrum, para. 28. 









the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal a few days before filing the 
application. 
 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal, by referring to its jurisprudence in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna and MOX Plant Cases, reaffirmed that “the obligation to proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views applies equally to both parties to the dispute”61 
and that “a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of 
the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been 
exhausted”62. Without providing more precision on its reasoning, the Tribunal finally  
stated that:    
 
[…] in the view of the Tribunal, the requirements of article 283 of the Convention are to be 
regarded, in the circumstances of the present case, as having been satisfied.63     
 
The Order held by ITLOS in the M/V“Louisa” Case was not a clarifying 
precedent in the interpretation of the functional principle of exhaustion of diplomatic 
means as embodied in Article 283 of UNCLOS. On the contrary, it was the 
manifestation of disagreement about the standard of compliance with prior exchange of 
views requirement, both in the particular circumstances under discussion and in more 
general terms64. The debates on the meaning of Article 283 reappeared in the Artic 
Sunrise Case. In opinion of some members of the Tribunal, the prior exchange of views 
means that a “negotiation or efforts to find a settlement by other peaceful means must 
take place65” while, in opinion of others, it requires exchange of views “regarding the 
most appropriate peaceful means of settlement, rather than the exhaustion of diplomatic 
                                                          
61 Ibid., para. 58. Citing, Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), 
Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, ITLOS Reports 2003, p. 10, at 19, para. 38). 
62Ibid., para 63. Citing its jurisprudence in Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. 
Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, at 295, para. 60); and 
MOX Plant (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, ITLOS 
Reports 2001, at p. 107, para. 60. 
63 Ibid., para. 65. 
64 Judge Wolfrumg rejected an interpretation of article 283 which “renders it meaningless” and noted, as 
well as Judge Treves, that the requirements of the article 283 must be taken seriously by the Tribunal 
(Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, paras. 27-28; 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Treves, para. 10). 
65 Case Nº 19: The M/V “Virginia G” Case (Panama/Guinez-Bisau), Judgment of 14 April 2014, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Golitsyn, para. 7. This was too the interpretation posed by Judge Wolfrum in 
the M/V “Louisa” case when arguing that the simple requirement of an exchange of views about the most 
appropriate way to settle the disputes is not in conformity with the terms of Article 283 (1), of the 
Convention. The reference to negotiation has “a distinct purpose clearly expressed in this provision 
namely to solve the dispute without recourse to the mechanisms set out in Section 2 of Part XV of the 









negotiations over the substantive issues dividing the parties66”. It seems at least 
admitted that “[t]he main purpose underlying 283 is to avoid the situation whereby a 
State is taken completely by surprise by the institution of proceedings against it”, as 
supported by the travaux préparatoires to the Convention67. In any case, as noted by 
Judge Chandrasekhara Rao, the exchange of views is a condition governing the 
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal competent under the dispositions of Section 2 of Part 
XV of UNCLOS and it should not be treated by ITLOS as a “meaningless formality to 
be dispensed with at the whims of a disputant”68. 
 
II- The Denegation of Provisional Measures 
 
In accordance with Article 290 (1) of UNCLOS, the ITLOS may prescribe 
measures “to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent 
serious harm to the marine environment”. Saint Vincent posed the question of the 
deterioration of the Louisa and the risk of releasing massive amounts of hydrocarbons in 
the port area (Puerto de Santa María)69. However, Spain replied that the Port authorities 
were continuously monitoring the situation and the Capitanía Marítima of Cadiz had an 
updated protocol for reacting against threats of any kind of environmental accident 
within the port and the Bay of Cadiz. Placing on record the assurances given by Spain70,  
[..] in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal does not find that there is a real and imminent 
risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties in dispute before the 
Tribunal so as to warrant the prescription of the provisional measures requested by Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines.71 
 
Consequently, by 17 votes to 4: 
 
Finds that the circumstances, as they now present themselves to the Tribunal, are not such as to 
require the exercise of its powers to prescribe provisional measures under article 290, paragraph 
1, of the Convention 
 
                                                          
66 Ibid., Declaration of Judge ad hoc Anderson, para 3. 
67 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume II, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 1993; Vol. V Settlement of Disputes, General and Final Provisions: Articles 
279 to 320, Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII and IX, Final Act, Annex I, Resolution I, III, and IV, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers , The Netherlands, 1989; Anderson, D. “Article 283 of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea”, in Modern Law of the Sea. Selected Essays, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 
2008, pp. 591-607. 
68 Case Nº 12: Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor 
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, Order of 8 October 2003, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Chandrasekhara Rao, para. 38.  
69 Request for Provisional Measures of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 23 November 2010, para. 63. 
70 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, paras. 74-78. 









After having denied the provisional measures requested by the Applicant, the 
ITLOS lead to the conclusion that any other measure or recommendation was required 
on the basis of its own appreciation. However, in other cases, as in the MOX Plant Case 
it imposed measures characterized by its “consensual approach”, since the Tribunal 
essentially was ordering cooperation between the parties in the prevention of pollution 
of the marine environment pending the decision on the merits72. In those cases, the 
ITLOS did not directly invoke the precautionary principle but seems instead to have 
invoked its own “precautionary approach”73, requiring parties to act on the basis of 
“prudence and caution” in its provisional measures orders. The M/V “Louisa” Case was 
not thoroughly an exception because the Tribunal reaffirmed the obligation on States to 
protect and preserve the marine environment under Article 192 of UNCLOS74. Then, it 
merely added that “in the view of the Tribunal, the parties should in the circumstances 
act with prudence and caution to prevent serious harm to the marine environment”75. 
 
Furthermore, some importance could be granted to the nature of the provisional 
measures requested by the Applicant: to order the release of the vessel Louisa and the 
returns of scientific research, information and property held since 2006. That 
provisional measures “were similar to measures which could have been ordered as the 
result of a decision on the merits. It would then seem difficult to grant such measures 
without already entering into the substance of the case”76.  
 
THE JUDGMENT: JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY MATTERS 
 
The main question addressed by the Tribunal in its Judgment on the merits was 
that of jurisdiction ratione materiae. In order to determine the nature of the relation 
between jurisdiction prima facie at the stage of the proceedings on provisional measures 
and jurisdiction on the merits, special consideration must be granted to the following 
assertion in the Order on 23 December 2010: 
 
                                                          
72 Case Nº: 10: The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 
December 2001, paras. 82-84 
73 S. Marr, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: The Precautionary Approach and Conservation and 
Management of Fish Resources", 11 Euro J Int'l L (2000), at 815. 
74 Provisional Measures, Order, supra note 8, para. 76. 
75 Ibid., para. 77.  Citing the jurisprudence of the Tribunal in Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand  v. 
Japan; Australia  v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, para. 77. 









“[…] Considering that the present Order in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of 
the Application, or relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the rights of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines and Spain to submit arguments in respect of those questions (see ICJ 
Case concerning questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. 
Senegal), Provisional Measures, Order of 28 May 2009, paragraph. 74)”77;    
 
In its Judgment the Tribunal only answered to jurisdictional issues posed by 
Spain concerning the inexistence of a dispute under the dispositions of UNCLOS. 
Having determined that it had no jurisdiction ratione materiae the ITLOS did not 
examine the arguments of Spain on Article 283 and those related to the admissibility of 
the claims –nationality of the reclamation and exhaustion of local remedies-.  
  
I- Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae  
When considering the existence of a dispute relating to the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS, the Tribunal identifies the following two aspects of the 
“Louisa” Case and deal with them successively: 
 
“[…] The Tribunal notes that the case before it has two aspects: one involving the detention of 
the vessel and the persons connected therewith and the other concerning the treatment of these 
persons. The first aspect relates to the claim originally submitted by Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines on the basis of articles 73, 87, 226, 227 and 303. The second aspect was introduced 
by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the basis of article 300 of the Convention only after the 
closure of the written proceedings. It was discussed during the oral proceedings and included in 
the final submissions of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines”78.     
 
a) Inexistence of a Dispute Relative to the Interpretation or Application of 
UNCLOS: The Original Claim  
 
In its advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950 on the Interpretation of Peace Treaties 
case, the ICJ stated:”[w]hether there exists an international dispute is a matter for 
objective determination”79. Later, in the South West Africa Cases, it added that “a mere 
assertion is not sufficient to prove the existence of a dispute any more than a mere 
denial of the existence of the dispute proved its nonexistence”80. One more, ITLOS 
                                                          
77 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, para. 80 
78 Ibid., para. 96. 
79 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, First Phase, (1950) ICJ Report 
65, at 70: Second Phase, (1950), ICJ Report 221. The dictum was applied again in the Case concerning 
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Preliminary Objections), (1996) ICJ Report 595, at. 614. 









made recourse to the case law of the ICJ when examined its jurisdiction rationae 
materiae and, citing the Oil Platforms case81, it stated that: 
 
“[…] To enable the Tribunal to  determine whether it has jurisdiction, it  must  establish a link 
between the facts advanced  by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  and the provisions  of the 
Convention  referred to  by it  and show that  such provisions can sustain the claim or claims 
submitted by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines82”.  
 
As the result of this analysis, ITLOS concludes that none of the articles of 
UNCLOS invoked by Saint Vincent could constitute a basis for its claims. Article 73 is 
excluded because the “Louisa” and its crew was not detained for the reason that the 
laws and regulations of Spain concerning the living resources in the exclusive economic 
zone had been violated83; Article 87 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to grant the 
M/V “Louisa” a right to leave the port and gain  access to the high seas notwithstanding 
its detention in the context of criminal proceedings against it84, as it will later confirm in 
the ARA Libertad case85; Articles 226 and 227 applies to investigation of foreign 
vessels for violation of international rules and standards for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, but this was not the case of the Louisa86. 
Regarding Article 245, thought the Applicant did not included it in its final submissions, 
the Tribunal stated that it could not be relevant87. Finally, the Applicant recognized that 
Article 303 was erroneously cited in its Reply88 and the Tribunal finds that the question 
of application of Article 304 –relative to responsibility and liability by damages- could 
arises only if it were to hold that it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case89.  
                                                          
81 [T]he Court cannot limit itself to noting that one of the Parties maintains that such a dispute exists, and 
the other denies it. It must ascertain whether the violations of the Treaty of 1955 pleaded by Iran do or do 
not fall within the provisions of the Treaty and whether, as a consequence, the dispute is one which the 
Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae to entertain, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2. (Oil Platforms  
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports   
1996, 803, at 810, para. 16)   
82 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, para. 99. 
83 Ibid. paras. 100-105. 
84 Ibid, paras. 106-110. We can emphasize with Churchill the fact that this interpretation of article 287 
which ITLOS latter adopted in the ARA Libertad case was not previously adopted in proceedings on 
provisional measures in the “Louisa” case (supra note 2, at 8) 
In the M/V “Louisa” case Spain additionally argued that the certificates for the vessel under the SOLAS 
Convention and the MARPOL Convention had expired well before the detention of the “Louisa”   on 1 
February 2006. But, in view of its interpretation of article 83, the Tribunal did not considered it necessary 
to pronounce up on the arguments of the Parties related to the seaworthiness of the “Louisa”.   
85 Case Nº 20: The ARA Libertad Case (Argentina v. Ghana), Provisional Measures, Order of 15 
December 2015. 
86 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, paras. 111-113. 
87 Ibid., paras. 114-117. 
88 Ibid., paras. 118-119. 









In sum, the Tribunal admitted the main argument of Spain since the legal actions taken 
against the vessel, its crew and its owners were completely unconnected with any such 
reasons foreseen in dispositions alleged by the Applicant. 
 
Additionally, Saint Vincent contended that the boarding of the Louisa was in 
violation of general international law and also in violation of Article 561 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure because it took place without the prior authorization of its captain 
or of the Consul of the flag State. In this way, the Louisa provides another precedent in 
the ITLOS jurisprudential interpretation of the Law of the Sea, in relation with the 
following conclusion: 
 
“[…] The Tribunal notes that there is no provision in the Convention which requires a port State 
to notify the flag State or to obtain the authorization of the flag State or of the master of a foreign 
vessel operated for commercial purposes such as the M/V “Louisa” before boarding and 
searching such a vessel docked at its port. Further, it is not incumbent upon the Tribunal to 
determine whether Spain has violated article 561 of its Code of Criminal Procedure by boarding 
the M/V “Louisa” without authorization. The Tribunal considers that the arguments advanced by 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in this regard have no bearing on the question of its 
jurisdiction90”.   
 
 
b) Article 300 of UNCLOS: a New Jurisdictional Title for a New Claim 
 
The underlined contribution of the M/V “Louisa” Case to the development of 
the ITLOS’s jurisprudence was in relation to the applicability of the doctrine of abuse of 
rights in the area of the Law of the Sea91. The doctrine of abuse of rights is closely 
related to the principles of good faith and due process92.Article 300 of UNCLOS93 reads 
as follows: 
“States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall 
exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which 
would not constitute an abuse of right”.   
                                                          
90 Ibid., para. 125 
91 Tanaka, supra note 4, at 205. 
92 A broad analysis of the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals on the invocation of abuse of 
rights doctrine in Tanaka, pp. 212-213. 
93 Other complementary agreements or multilateral agreements relate to the purposes of the Convention 
contains similar dispositions on the abuse of rights doctrine: Article 34 of the Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (8 September 1995) ; Article 33 of the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (5 September 
2000); Article 13, paragraph 8, of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery 










This doctrine was never questioned by Spain. On the contrary, Article 300 was 
invoked in its Response to the Applicant’s Request of provisional measures94. Also, in 
its Counter-Memorial it made recourse to the doctrine of abuse of process by the part of 
the Applicant95. Then, after the finalization of the written proceedings -when Saint 
Vincent announced to the Tribunal that “during public hearings its advocate will 
address certain jurisdictional issues, including but not limited to human rights violations 
related to, inter alia, basic precepts of international law and Article 300 of UNCLOS”-
96, Spain noted, in a letter to the Tribunal, that the announcement by the Applicant was 
in contradiction with the principle of “equal arms” and the most basic principles of due 
process97.  
 
During the hearings, Saint Vincent replaced effectively its previous claims with 
a completely new reasoning. Professor Norquist outlined that “[t]he first major point 
offered by the Applicant [was] to urge that the Tribunal has jurisdiction on the merits in 
this case based on Article 300 of the Convention”98. In this way, the new Louisa case 
was presented as “a challenging case, perhaps even a landmark case, in the progressive 
development of international law”99.  
 
Briefly stated, the doctrine of abuse of rights cited in article 300 is founded on the obligation of  
States under international law to act in good faith in fulfilling their treaty commitments. 
Oppenheim explains that the doctrine arises when a State avails itself of its right in an arbitrary 
manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be justified by 
legitimate considerations of its own advantage. Thus, even if technically acting within the law, a 
State may incur liability by abusing its rights. The Applicant maintains that the record shows that 
Spain has violated its obligations with respect to the Applicant under the Convention. Part of the 
violation is that the arrests and subsequent treatment of certain persons and the detention of the 
vessel Louisa were illegal. In the latter case, the local authorities did not have prior consent to 
board and search the Louisa from either the Master or the Applicant, as required by both Spanish 
and international law100. 
 
                                                          
94 Provisional Measures, Written Response of the Kingdom of Spain, Part II, supra note 6, para. 75. 
95 Merits, Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Spain, supra note 7, paras. 187-190. 
96 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, para.127. 
97 Ibid., para. 128. 
98 Presentation by Professor Nordquist, Counsel and Advocate of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Verbatin Record, 5 October 2012, ITLOS/PV.12/18/4, ITLOS/SPV.12/C18/4, at 10, 47-48. 
99 Ibid., at 10, 37-39. 









By the part of Spain, Professor Escobar provided compelling arguments against 
the recourse to Article 300 as a new title of jurisdiction for a new claim101, when noting 
that: 
“[…] principle of good faith and the prohibition of the abuse of rights must be applied within the 
framework defined in article 300, namely […] “the rights … jurisdiction and ... freedoms 
recognized in [the] Convention”. 
[…] In any event, the drafting of article 300 does not provide us with pointers to the 
interpretation of its object and purpose, except perhaps the fact that it comes in part XVI of the 
Convention entitled “General provisions”, which permits us to draw our first conclusion, namely 
that the scope of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of the abuse of rights is not 
limited to any given part of the Convention. Quite the contrary; the principle of good faith is 
applicable to each and every one of the provisions contained in the Convention, but always 
within the framework and the bounds of the Convention102”. 
 
Regarding the applicability of Article 300, Spain contended that a systematic 
interpretation of the UNCLOS in line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of abuse of rights is applicable in 
connection to the exercise of the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in the 
Convention. Nonetheless, Saint Vincent had not succeeded in identifying any such 
provisions applicable to the Louisa Case. The lack of an autonomous applicability of 
Article 300 was supported by the travaux preparatoires for the Convention103 and the 
ITLOS’s case law104. In two contentious cases –the Bluefin Tuna Case and the case 
concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor105- and 
in the consultative procedure on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area106-, Article 300 
                                                          
101 Presentation by Professor Escobar Hernández, Agent, Counsel and Advocate of Spain, Verbatin 
Record, 10 October 2012, ITLOS/PV.12/C18/11, 10. 
102 Ibid., at 13. 
103 Presentation by Professor Jiménez Piernas, Counsel and Advocate of Spain, Verbatin Record, 10 
October 2012ITLOS/PV.12/C18/11, at. 11. See also, M.H. Nordquist, S. Rosenne, and L.B. Sohn, eds., 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. V (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1989) at 150-152. 
104 Presentation by Professor Escobar, supra note 100. 
Again in the Duzgit Integrity case, in a dispute between Malta and Säo Tomé and Principe, Malta invoked 
Article 300 together with other disposition of UNCLOS before the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under 
Annex VII. 
105 In their Declarations, President Nelson and Judge Anderson, include argument on the basis of the 
principle of good faith without however making any explicit reference to Article 300 (supra note 64). 
106 In its advisory opinion the Tribunal referred expressis verbis to article 300 as criteria for interpreting 
the margin of discretion enjoyed by a State in the process of the adoption of laws and regulations and the 
taking of administrative measures” (Case Nº 17: Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring 
persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the 









was relied on by the Parties always in conjunction with other provisions of the 
Convention. Finally, in its Judgment: 
 
“The Tribunal finds that it is apparent from the language of article 300 of the Convention that 
article 300 cannot be invoked on its own. It becomes relevant only when “the rights, jurisdiction 
and freedoms “recognized” in the Convention are exercised in an abusive manner”107.                                 
 
The next issue expressly addressed by Spain was that of the relationship between 
Article 300 and human rights108. While UNCLOS is not a human rights instrument, it 
must be admitted that human rights should be taken into consideration in the process of 
applying the Convention. This is quite apparent when considering the humanitarian 
dimension of the special proceedings on prompt release of vessels and its crews, in 
connection with alleged breaches of the dispositions of the Convention on this matter109. 
However, the Tribunal has never ruled in abstracto on violations of due process and 
human rights. This is merely a consequence of its specific jurisdiction as the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Thereof, another controversial point of 
the Louisa Judgment was that, having established it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the 
                                                          
107 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, para. 137. The only argument defended by some Judges was that 
Article 300 could be linked to Article 2 (3) of the LOS Convention with respect to sovereignty within 
territorial sea being exercisable subject to the Convention and “other rules of international law” 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 61; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lucky, paras. 63-66; Separate 
Opinion of Judge Bougetarie, paras. 33-36). 
108 Presentation by Professor Escobar, supra note 100, at. 15-18. 
109 The “Juno Trader” and the “Tomimaru” Case could be mentioned. In its Separate Opinion in Juno 
Trader case, Judge Treves examined in detail this matter: “[i]n a prompt-release case unnecessary use of 
force and violations of due process and of human rights in general may be relevant in various ways. In 
particular, lack of due process, when it consists in late communication of charges, in delay and 
uncertainty as to the procedure followed by the authorities, in lack of action by the authorities, may justify 
a claim that the obligation of prompt release has been violated even when the time elapsed might not be 
seen as excessive had it been employed in orderly proceedings with full respect of due process 
requirements. The same may apply when lack of due process is used to reach quickly the conclusion of 
domestic proceedings without seriously affording a possibility to consider arguments in favor of the 
detained vessel and crew. In both cases unnecessary use of force and violations of human rights and due 
process of law are elements that must also be taken into consideration in fixing a bond or guarantee that 
can be considered as reasonable. The idea of abuse of rights is very close to that of lack of reasonableness 
and consideration of article 300 of the Convention should not be outside the scope of the complex process 
that brings the Tribunal to fixing a guarantee it considers reasonable” (Case Nº 13: The "Juno Trader" 
Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea-Bissau), Prompt Release, Judgment of 18 December 
2004, Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, para. 5). In a similar vein, Vice-President Nelson, observed that 
in Article 292 “the notion of reasonableness is ...used to curb the arbitrary exercise of the discretionary 
power granted to coastal States” (Case Nº 6: The "Monte Confurco" Case (Seychelles v. France), Prompt 
Release, Judgment of 18 December 2000, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Nelson).   
The link between UNCLOS and the International Law of Human Rights –in particular, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- had been alleged later by Netherlands in the Artic Sunrise Case.  
The ITLOS adopted an Order on provisional measures under article 290(5). But the decision on the merits 









case, the ITLOS made general pronouncements on obligations of States under general 
international human rights law110. 
 
Another main issue, was the procedural dimension of the doctrine of abuse of 
rights as invoked by Spain. While Article 300 is a general provision applicable 
horizontally vis-à-vis the entire Convention 111 then, the principle of good faith and the 
prohibition of abuse of rights must be respected in the exercise of the procedural rights 
conferred on the Parties by the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention. In this 
way, Spain rejected the procedural manoeuvre of the Applicant’s –known as the “new 
case” strategy-, changing unexpectedly its arguments after the closure of the written 
proceedings by a new reasoning based, paradoxically, on Article 300. In its Judgment,  
 
“The Tribunal considers that this reliance on article 300 of the Convention generated a new 
claim in comparison to the claims presented in the Application; it is not included in the original 
claim. The Tribunal further observes that it is a legal requirement that any new claim to be 
admitted must arise directly out of the application or be implicit in it (see Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 
240, at p. 266, para. 67).  
[…] In short, the dispute brought before the Tribunal by an application cannot be transformed 
into another dispute which is different in character.   
[…] The Tribunal may also refer in this connection to the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the ICJ in interpreting the corresponding provisions in their Statutes 
and Rules.  (Prince von Pless Administration, Order of 4 February 1933, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, 
No. 52, p. 11, at p. 14; Société commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, 
No. 78, p. 160, at p. 173; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 161, at p. 213, para. 117)”112.   
 
The ITLOS found that recourse to Article 300 by the Applicant transformed the 
dispute into one of a different character. This was contrary to Articles 24 (1) and 54 of 
the Rules, which are considered as essential from the point of view of legal security and 
the good administration of justice113. Some arguments were posed as to whether the late 
                                                          
110 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, paras. 154-155. Some Judges rejected the inclusion of this references 
to human rights. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, paras. 68-69; Separate Opinion of Judge Bouguetaia, 
paras. 9-12. 
111 As noted by Tanaka, the prohibition of abuse of rights can also be seen in provisions with regard to an 
abuse of legal process, Article 294 (1); arbitral refusal, Article 297 (3) (b) (ii) and (iii); and excess of 
jurisdiction, Article 187 (b) (ii). (Tanaka, supra note 4, at 213) 
112 Merits, Judgment, supra note 7, paras. 142-144. Citing Prince von Pless Administration, Order of 4 
February 1933, P.C.I.J Series A/B No 52, p. 14; Société Commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, 
P.C.I.J Series A/B No 78, p. 17; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 265, para. 63); and Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran 
v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 213, para. 117. 
113Merits, Judgment, supra note 7, para. 148. Citing Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. 









claim on the basis of Article 300 was a new claim or an additional claim114. But, in any 
case, these Judges rejected the admissibility of the claims115 or supported the lack of ius 
standing by the Applicant116. Later, when the application of the “Louisa” jurisprudence 
to the M/V “Virginia G” Case was debated, Judge Ndiaye asserted that the Tribunal 
could not recharacterize the dispute because it would be acting ultra vires117.  
Then, the Tribunal was to the conclusion in the M/V “Louisa” Case it lacked 
jurisdiction ratione materiae: 
 
“[…] The Tribunal therefore is of the view that article 300 of the Convention cannot serve as a 
basis for the claims submitted by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.   
[…] For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal concludes that no dispute concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention existed between the Parties at the time of the 
filing of the Application and that, therefore, it has no jurisdiction ratione materiae to entertain 
the present case”118 
 
I- Admissibility of the claims: the nature of the procedure and claims 
and the rules on diplomatic protection 
 
Having found it lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae, the ITLOS found it was not 
necessary to consider the additional arguments of Spain concerning jurisdiction and 
admissibility119. It excluded a new discussion on the jurisdictional requirements of the 
exhaustion of exchange of views under Article 283120, but the main question is the total 
absence of pronouncement on admissibility issues as alleged by Spain121.  
 
The admissibility matters where connected with the determination of the nature 
of the proceedings and the claims hold by the Applicant. The M/V “Louisa” Case was 
an ordinary contentious procedure instituted by the flag State in order to seek 
diplomatic protection of the crew and other persons related to the activities of the 
vessel, including the proprietors. Thereof, for Spain, the conditions of the admissibility 
                                                          
114 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, paras. 14-21; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lucky, para. 46; 
Separate Opinion of Judge Bouguetaia, para. 21; Separate Opinion of Judge Kateka, paras.12-14.  
115 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, para 65. 
116 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Ndiaye, paras. 126-128. 
117Case Nº 19: The M/V "Virginia G" Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment of 14 April 2014, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ndiaye, para. 125.  
118 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, paras. 150-151. 
119 Judge Ndiaye and Judge Lucky considered these questions in their Separate and Dissenting Opinion, 
respectively. See too, Tanaka, supra note 4, at 15-16. 
120 On this matter, Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, Separate Opinion of Judge Kateka (para. 17) and 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lucky (paras 15-21). 









of the claims were governed by the rules of general international law on diplomatic 
protection and liability of the State, as confirmed by pertinent dispositions of UNCLOS 
and the case law of the ITLOS. In particular, the rules regarding the nationality of the 
claim, the exhaustion of local remedies and, in certain cases, the requirement of “clean 
hands”, were thoroughly applicable to the Louisa case. It results from these rules that 
the remedy to natural and juridical persons affected were, if any, procedural action 
before the Spanish courts with the additional grant of an action before the European 
Court of Human Rights. At the time of the closure of the hearings in October 2012 the 
internal criminal proceedings were ongoing and, as Spain contented, not submission for 
the release of the Louisa had been made, neither by the owners of the vessel nor by the 
flag State122. 
 
On the contrary, from the earliest stage of the proceedings, the presentation of 
the case by Saint Vincent caused confusion with the procedure on prompt release under 
Article 292 of UNCLOS123. The Applicant made recourse to the rules, principles and 
jurisprudence of prompt release proceedings as if they were also applicable to any other 
proceedings where the claims posed by the flag State were in some kind of connection 
with the detention of the vessel. The main purpose was the recourse to the doctrine of 
functional protection by the flag State of crew’s members regardless their nationality -
as established by the ITLOS in The M/V “SAIGA” (Nº 2) Case124- and the invocation of 
the exception to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies -as supported by the ITLOS in 
the Monte Confurco Case-. However, during hearings, the representatives of the Saint 
Vincent progressively were in necessity to admit that the Applicant was seeking to 
exercise some category of diplomatic protection on the basis of Article 300125. 
 
a) Nationality of the claim 
                                                          
122 Presentation by Professor Aznar, supra note, at 12. 
123 The substantive and formal requirements of the prompt release of vessels and crews proceedings, 
Treves, T., “The Proceedings Concerning Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews before the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 11, Nº 2, 
1996, pp. 179-200. 
124 P. Gautier, “L’Etat du pavillon et la protection des intéréts liés au navire”, in M.J. Kohen, La 
promotion de la Justice, des Droits de L’homme Et du Règlement des Conflits Par le Droit International,   
(Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, The Netherlands, 2007) 717; J. Veroeven, “Diplomatic Protection by the 
Flag State In Favour of the Crew of a Ship”, 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/opinies/dipl.pdf. 









The first element required to the exercise of ordinary diplomatic protection is the 
nationality of the victim126. Nonetheless, the only formal link between Saint Vincent 
and the litigious matter was its condition as the flying State of the Louisa. The 
incertitude about the nationality of the Gemini III was open. The Applicant argued that 
Gemini III was a tender of the Louisa inextricably linked to it and so was not required to 
have a flag of its own. But for the Tribunal the Gemini III was independent127. Spain 
also discussed the effective nationality of the Louisa on the basis of the requirement of a 
“genuine link” under Article 91, as complemented by Article 94, of UNCLOS.  
Nonetheless, the main question was the absence of the link of nationality 
between the Applicant and the natural and juridical persons, mostly nationals of USA, 
“for whom it [was] responsible as a flag State or for whom international law gives it 
remedies for breaches by the Respondent in this case”128. Firstly, the legitimation of the 
Applicant seemed to be conceived as an extension of the mentioned doctrine on the 
“functional unity” of the ship and its crew, regardless its nationality, as admitted by the 
ITLOS in prompt release proceedings. Secondly, the legitimation of the Applicant was 
conceived as an actio popularis under the customary international law of human rights, 
including property rights129. 
 
Contrary to the Applicant’s allegation, Spain stated that where a State submits to 
the Tribunal an application on the grounds of the exercise of diplomatic protection, 
there is no reason whatsoever to conclude that the general rule of international law 
requiring a nationality link must be expected and left unapplied. The jurisprudence on 
functional unity adopted by the ITLOS in the M/V “SAIGA” (Nº2) Case130 prompted the 
                                                          
126Mavrommatis Palestine Concession, Judgmen Nº 2, 1924, P.C.J.I., Series A. Nº 2, 12; Biens 
britaniques au Marco espagnol (Espagna/RoyanneUni), R.S.A., II, p. 706; The Panevezyo-Saldutiskis 
Railway Case, Judgment of February 28th 1939, P.C.J.I. Series A/B, Nº. 76, p. 16; Notebhom Case 
(second phase), Judgment of April 6th: I.C.J., Reports 1955, p. 4. 
127 Merits, Judgment, supra note 9, para. 87 
128 Presentation by Professor Norquist, supra note 97, at 13. 
129 Ibid., at 21. In this regard, he stated that: “any State may pursue remedies for their violation, even if 
the individual victim is not a national of the complaining State and the violation does not affect any other 
particular interest of that Sate. This basic right of human beings was cited in the Barcelona Traction 
case”(Ibid., at 13)  
130 “[…] the Convention considers a ship as a unit, as regards the obligations of the flag State with respect 
to the ship and the right of a flag State to seek reparation for loss or damage caused to the ship by acts of 
other States and to institute proceedings under article 292 of the Convention. Thus the ship, everything on 
it, and every person involved or interested in its operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag State. 
The nationalities of these persons are not relevant” (Case Nº 2: The M/V“SAIGA” (Nº 2) Case (Saint 









International Law Commission to include article 18 (Protection of Ships’s Crews) in its 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection on 2006131. However, this provision could not be 
regarded as the recognition of a general rule under any circumstance132. According to 
the wording of Article 292, in prompt release proceedings the flag State could exercise a 
short of functional protection over the crew regardless of nationality, but this protection 
only can be justified by the nature and object of this summary procedure, particularly in 
cases of vessels with large crews133. 
 
b) Exhaustion of local remedies under article 295 of UNCLOS 
In the M/V“SAIGA” (Nº 2) Case134, the ITLOS state that Article 295 of the 
Convention refers to the rules of general international law as established in the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunal and the process of codification of 
international law. This disposition reads as follows: 
 
Any dispute between States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention may be submitted to the procedures provided for in this section only after local 
remedies have been exhausted where this is required by international law 
 
It is a well-established rule of customary international law that the obligation of 
exhaustion of local remedies is determined by the nature of the rights claimed. Saint 
Vincent contended that, in this case, Spain violated Article 300 in relation to both the 
Applicant itself as a sovereign nation and to private individuals and corporations for 
whom the Applicant was responsible under the Convention and international law135. 
This matter was not considered by the Tribunal, so it did not hold on the applicability of 
the jurisprudence of the ITLOS in the “Camouco” Case136 not in prompt release but in 
                                                          
131 It reads as follows: “The right of the State of nationality of the members of the crew of a ship to 
exercise diplomatic protection is not affected by the right of the State of nationality of a ship to seek 
redress on behalf of such crew members, irrespective of their nationality, when they have been injured in 
connection with an injury to the vessel resulting from an internationally wrongful act” (Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10).  
132 Counter-Memorial, supra note 7, para. 105. 
133 Ibid.,, para. 100. 
134 Supra note 125 para. 96. 
135 Presentation by Professor Norquist, supra note 97, at 24.  
136 “[..] In the view of the Tribunal, it is not logical to read the requirement of exhaustion of local 
remedies or any other analogous rule into article 292. Article 292 of the Convention is designed to free a 
ship and its crew from prolonged detention […] Equally, it safeguards the interests of the coastal State by 
providing for release only upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security determined by 
a court or tribunal referred to in article 292, without prejudice to the merits of the case in the domestic 
forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew.  
[…] Article 292 provides for an independent remedy and not an appeal against a decision of a national 
court. No limitation should be read into article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very object 









ordinary proceedings. Nonetheless Spain noted that the Tribunal had developed its 
reasoning on the matter by reference to the concept of a “jurisdictional link”137. The 
jurisdictional connection between Spain and the natural or juridical persons affected in 
relation to the detention of the Louisa, was undeniable because all the relevant activities 
of that persons took place inside the Spanish territorial waters and in areas within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Spain. So, for Spain, the doctrine of the “Camouco” Case on 





Tough the M/V Louisa Case was submitted to the ITLOS by virtue of a poorly 
argued or a manifestly unfounded application, it was finally a real case of interest, both 
at the stage of the proceedings on provisional measures and on the merits. Even, it 
established a new precedent on the application of the doctrine of abuse of rights (Article 
300 of UNCLOS) in the area of the Law of the Sea. 
 
Regarding the ITLOS’s reasoning on jurisdictional matters, both in the Order of 
23 December 2010 on provisional measures and in the Judgment of 28 May 2013 on the 
Merits, two main conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, the broad assertion by the 
Tribunal that the Convention does not preclude a declaration by virtue of Article 287 
limited to a particular category of disputes or the possibility of making a declaration 
immediately before filing a case, could be probably in need of a major clarification and 
improvement by the ITLOS in the future. Particularly, regarding the validity and effects 
of “reservations” ratione materiae to the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal competent 
under provisions of Section 2, Part XV, of UNCLOS. Secondly, the debates in the 
Louisa Case have contributed to highlighting the disagreement among the members of the 
Tribunal regarding both the low threshold on prima facie jurisdiction and on exhaustion 
of prior exchange of views, as applied hitherto by the Tribunal. This is a matter of 
interest, because they are both prominent rules governing the jurisdiction of the ITLOS, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies could be exhausted in such a short period” 
(Case Nº 5: The « Camouco » Case (Panama  v. France), Prompt Release, Judgment of 7 February 2000, 
paras. 57-58 ). 
137 Supra note 125, para. 100. 









and any other forum competent, by virtue of Articles 288 (1) and 283 (1) of UNCLOS. 
At the same time, it should be noted that the original tendency pro-jurisdiction assumed  
by ITLOS has found its exceptions in “Grand Prince” and the M/V “Louisa” Cases139.  
 
More important, the jurisprudence in the M/V “Louisa” Case is now relied by 
the ITLOS as evidenced in the M/V “Virginia G” Case, while completed with more 
explicit pronunciations about the burden and standard of proof on the existence of and 
abuse of rights under Article 300, necessarily in connection with the exercise of the 
rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized by the UNCLOS. In this way, the 
arguments posed by Spain in the Louisa case has been incorporated into international 
jurisprudence:  
Before proceeding to the examination of the question of whether article 300 of the Convention 
was violated in the present case, the Tribunal finds it necessary to refer to its jurisprudence on 
the issue in the M/V "Louisa" Case. 
In that case, the Tribunal found that “it is apparent from the language of article 300 of the 
Convention that article 300 cannot be invoked on its own” and that “[i]t becomes relevant only 
when ‘the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized’ in the Convention are exercised in an 
abusive manner” (The M/V “Louisa” Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of 
Spain), Judgment of 28 May 2013, para. 137)140. 
  
Considering this fact and the ruling of the ITLOS in its Judgment of 28 May 
2013, it could be said that the final result of the M/V Louisa Case was highly favorable 
to Spain. 
                                                          
139 Escobar, supra note 4, at 187. 
140 Supra note 114, paras. 395-396. 
